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This  paper  evaluates  whether  Nigeria  is  ready  to  adopt  inflation  targeting  (IT),  a  monetary  policy 
framework that several emerging markets have adopted over the last one decade. The paper reviews 
literature on selected conditions for successful implementation of IT and then focuses on whether one 
specific  precondition  of  an  empirically  stable  monetary  transmission  mechanism  is  tenable.  Vector 
autoregressive  (VAR)  model  was  applied  using  select  monetary  policy  and  other  macroeconomic 
variables  to  explore  the  various  channels  using  the  Granger  causality  tests,  impulse  responses,  and 
variance decompositions. Results show that inflation in Nigeria is impassive to monetary transmission 
variables in the model. Specifically, weak link between prices and credit and interest rate channels were 
established. However, evidence of strong inverse link between exchange rate and prices was found in the 
model.  This suggests  exchange  rate  pass-through  on  the level of  prices in the  economy.  The paper, 
therefore, recommends the pursuance of IT lite in Nigeria.  
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1.1    Introduction 
Since early 1990’s inflation targeting (IT) has been increasingly viewed as a good monetary 
policy framework and was widely acclaimed by economist and policymakers alike. Because of 
its  enormous  potentials  as  an  effective  instrument  of  managing  inflation,  nations  that  have 
adopted  it  never  turn  back.  Inflation  targeting  is  a  monetary  policy  regime,  which  is 
characterized by public announcement of official target ranges or quantitative targets for price 
level increases and by explicit acknowledgement that low inflation is the most crucial long-run 
objective of the monetary authorities. According to Savensson (1999) IT framework sets out very 
clear  goals  for  monetary  policy,  defines  responsibilities,  and  establishes  measures  of 
accountability and transparency. It is however, characterized as ‘constrained discretion’ because 
it requires the central bank to not only set out clear targets, but to use appropriate instruments to 
hit the target, Fischer (2000). Loayza and Soto (2002) observe that although the term inflation 
targeting  is  now  commonly  used  by  bankers  and  scholars,  several  features  of  this  monetary 
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regime and its effects on economic performance remain elusive. After experiencing moderate, 
but,  persistent  inflation  rates  for  more  than  two  decades,  industrialized  economies  have 
controlled and maintained inflation at historically low levels in recent years. Evidences have 
shown that Inflation targeting frameworks have often been adopted in even economies without a 
history of stable inflation; this is particularly so for countries of Latin America and Africa who 
were seen as epitome of chronically high inflation. For instance, Chile and Brazil had inflation 
rate of 26 percent and 19 percent, respectively, prior to IT adoption and they have had a success 
story on inflation targeting. 
 
Since the early 1990s, inflation targeting (IT) has become a popular choice of monetary policy 
regime, with more than 20 countries - both developed and emerging market economies that now 
adhere to IT framework. Evidences have shown that countries adopted IT under many different 
circumstances, ranging from a well-planned switch from a different policy regime (New Zealand, 
Canada) to the solution of a currency crisis (United Kingdom). Equally IT has been pursued with 
different vigor and under different sets of institutional arrangements - see Bamidele, 2007; for a 
detailed  review  of  cross  country  experiences  and  prerequisites  for  successful  IT  in  both 
developed and emerging economies. Nonetheless, the prerequisites include but are not limited to: 
independence of the central bank; absence of fiscal dominance, that is, where a Central Bank 
bears minimal burden of financing government deficit; a single, well-defined inflation target; a 
high degree of transparency and accountability of the Central Bank; a good inflation forecasting 
model; sufficiently virile financial markets in terms of both depth and breadth to be able to 
absorb the placement of both public and private debt instruments; etc.  
 
This paper will not assess the merits and demerits of IT as this has been extensively discussed in 
previous  studies:  See,  for  example,  Debelle  (1997),  Masson,  Savastano,  and  Sharma  (1997), 
Tutar (2002) and Truman (2003). It has, however, been observed by Bakradze and Billmeier 
(2007) that the growing number of countries that target inflation and the perceived success of 
this monetary policy strategy serve as a stimulus for countries that engage in alternative regimes 
- such as monetary or exchange rate targeting - to shift to IT or to consider more seriously, such a 
shift in the near future. Consequently, this consideration raises the question of how to evaluate 
whether a country is ready to join the group of inflation targeters now, later or even never. 3 
 
Considerations for IT framework in Nigeria started since 2000 with the presentation of a position 
paper on the subject in the Bank; Uchendu, 2000. In furtherance to this, the Bank devoted its 
fifteenth annual conference to the theme “Inflation Targeting in Nigeria” in 2006.  Similarly, 
with the enactment of the 2007 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Act, operational autonomy of the 
CBN was strengthened. The Bank was charged with the responsibility of achieving price stability 
among other functions and the appointment and removal of the CBN Governor is subject to the 
confirmation  of  the  Senate  as  enshrined  in  the  Act.  Uchendu  (2007)  further  noted  that  the 
launching of the Financial System Strategy (FSS) 2020, added vigor towards implementation of 
IT framework in the country since it hinges on strategic objective of achieving low single digit 
inflation.  The  Bank  on  its  part  decomposed  its  Research  and  Statistics  Department  into  a 
department each with a view to strengthen and improve the quality of data and research output 
carried out in different aspects of monetary policy implementation. Recently, modeling unit in 
the Research department is charged with the task of developing a robust model for Nigeria. To 
date, there is sufficiently large body of literature on lessons deduced for Nigeria on IT.   
 
While  these  positive  developments  take  place,  it  is  imperative  to  assess,  from  empirical 
standpoint, whether Nigeria is ready for IT or not. A number of empirical studies have come up 
with different conclusions on the level of preparedness of different countries on adoption of IT 
framework. Weak Central Bank accountability and high financial instability, for instance, were 
the main concern in Chile’s bid to IT according to Mishkin (2000); Central Bank independence 
in South Africa according to Jonsson (1999) and Bakradze and Billmeier (2007) hammered on 
the need for Georgia’s Central Bank to overcome some institutional and operational weaknesses 
before it implements IT.  South Africa is ready for IT according to Woglom (2000) and Poland 
according to Christofferson, Solk and Wescott (2001). Against this background, the main aim of 
this paper is to assess whether Nigeria is ready for the implementation of inflation targeting. It, 
therefore,  seeks  to  estimate  the  quantitative  relationship  between  inflation,  monetary  policy 
instruments and output. The paper extends the analysis further by exploring the nature of some 
monetary transmission channels. Empirical data from 1986Q1 to 2006Q4 would be sourced from 
publications of the Central Bank of Nigeria. 4 
 
The main indicators are; Consumer price index, gross domestic product, money supply (M2), 
interest rate, exchange rate, fiscal balance, ratio of credit to money supply, treasury bills rate and 
lending rate  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: following this introduction is literature review and 
theoretical issues in section two. Central Bank independence, transparency and accountability 
and recent developments in monetary policy implementation are reviewed in section three while 
section four presents the research methodology of the paper. Results and discussions come up in 
section five and conclusions and recommendations in section six.   
II.  Literature Review and Theoretical Issues 
The need for stable prices in an economy has since been documented in both theoretical and 
empirical literature. This is because of the adverse effect of inflation on the economy – price 
distortion,  flourishing  of  rent-seeking  activities,  misallocation  of  scarce  resources  and  social 
unrest. The negative effect of inflation on of economic growth has been explored in many studies 
see,  for  example,  Barro  (1995),  Bruno  and  Easterly  (1995)  and  Ghosh  and  Phillips  (1998). 
According to Krueger (2005) inflation distorts resource allocation in the economy. It hurts the 
poorest  members  of  society  disproportionately.  It  creates  uncertainty  and  it  arbitrarily 
redistributes income and wealth. It undermines macroeconomic stability and it makes sustained 
rapid  growth  impossible  to  achieve.  The  choice  of  inflation  targeting  as  instrument  of 
macroeconomic management is increasingly gaining grounds since the pioneering example by 
New Zealand and Chile. 
  
To  date,  over  20  countries,  both  developed  and  emerging  economies  have  switched  to  this 
strategy and their performance is remarkable. According to Loayza and Soto (2002) except for 
two  countries  that  became  part  of  the  European  Monetary  Union  (Finland  and  Spain),  no 
inflation-targeting  country  has  ever  abandoned  the  regime.  What  then  exactly  is  inflation 
targeting?  Although  definitions  differ  in  detail,  there  is  some  consensus  on  the  main 
characteristics of this monetary regime: the existence of an explicit quantitative goal that engages 
the central bank in the primary objective of price stability; the lack of fiscal dominance and the 
absence  of  competing  nominal  objectives;  and  a  monetary  institution  that  enjoys  instrument 
independence and operates transparently and openly to the public.  5 
 
The following definition by Mishkin (2000) of inflation targeting captures most of the issues 
raised in the literature. 
 
“Inflation targeting is a monetary policy strategy that encompasses five main elements: i) the 
public  announcement  of  medium  term  numerical  target  for  inflation;  ii)  an  institutional 
commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, to which other goals 
are subordinated; iii) an information inclusive strategy in which many variables, and not just 
monetary  aggregates  or  the  exchange  rate,  are  used  for  deciding  the  setting  of  policy 
instruments;  iv)  increased  transparency  of  the  monetary  policy  strategy  through 
communication with the public and the markets about the plans, objectives and decisions of 
the monetary authorities; v) increased accountability of the Central Bank for attaining its 
inflation objectives”.  
 
Although in practice no two countries or their central banks implement or have identical IT 
framework, yet a combination of the above elements have characterized the implantation of IT in 
most countries. Some central banks, for example the Reserve Bank of Australia, have a dual 
mandate combining price stability with full employment. In addition, for some central banks, the 
target (or sequence of targets) is a point, and for others it is a range, some define time horizon 
over which the target is to be achieved while some do not, etc., Truman and Janeiro (2002).  
 
In the case of a point target, for instance, the central bank essentially by construction will not hit 
the target every month, quarter or year, but a miss of a certain size triggers a reporting and 
review process; this sounds more demanding on the side of the bank. Where the framework on 
the other hand involves a range, it does not specify time frame over which inflation is expected 
to  return  to  the  range.  Although  this  omission  may  be  viewed  as  a  defect  of  the  particular 
country’s  regime  it,  however,  reduces  the  rigor  of  the  regime,  adding  a  further  element  of 
discretion. 
 
The main goal of inflation targeting is the attainment of low level of inflation. This paves way 
for macroeconomic stability, wipe away uncertainty and promote long term contracts. Seyfried 
and  Bremmer  (2003)  stated  that  the  goal  of  inflation  targeting  is  not  on  containing  current 
inflation, but on intermediate and long term goal. As such, Central Banks according to Bernanke 
and Mishkin (1997) should pay close attention to indicators that have predictive power of future 
inflation.    Pui  (2003)  cautions  that  inflation  targeting  in  its  pure  sense  (where  output  and 
economic  growth  are  given  no  weights)  is  not  likely  to  maximize  social  welfare  since  the 
contraction or expansion of the economy does not matter so long as the inflation target is met 6 
 
 
Evaluating the success of IT countries, Mishkin and Posen (1997) discovered that IT has been 
highly successful in helping countries …... to maintain low inflation rates and that there is no 
evidence that IT has produced undesirable effects on the real economy in the long run; instead it 
has likely had the effect of improving the climate for economic growth. Recent evidences have 
shown  that  the  negative  effect  of  high  and  variable  inflation  on  macroeconomic  stability, 
economic growth and income distribution largely outweigh the potential benefits derived from 
financing fiscal deficits through monetization. That it is no longer fashionable to hold onto the 
age-long growth-inflation substitution hypothesis propounded by A.W. Phillips
3. Furthermore, 
Bamidele  (2007)  showed  that  most  of  the  countries  on  IT  framework  have  been  able  to 
simultaneously achieve a reduction in inflation as well as increase in output. 
Notwithstanding the above success stories, a number of baseline studies have investigated both 
the theoretical and empirical basis for implementing IT as a monetary policy regime from varied 
perspectives; conditions for successful implementation of IT, reasons why countries switch to IT 
regime, who sets the inflation targets, constructing and evaluating competitive empirical models, 
etc. While Masson, Savastano & Sharma (1997) for instance, argued that the requirements of IT 
in  most  developing  countries  are  absent  due  to  seigniorage  or  due  to  lack  of  consensus  on 
attaining  low  inflation  as  a  primary  objective;  due  to  lack  of  powerful  models  which  could 
enable  successful  inflation  forecast  according  to  Kadioglu,  Ozdemir  &  Yilmaz  (2000);  or 
because  of  relatively  weak  central  banks’  accountability  and  high  financial  sector  instability 
caused by flexible exchange rate according to Morande and Schmidt-Herbel (1999) and Mishkin 
(2000). However, this concern was examined critically by Reyes (2004) and his conclusion was 
that several studies have shown that over the past five to ten years the pass-through effect from 
currency depreciation into inflation has been decreasing in emerging economies that adopted 
inflation targeting during the mid and late nineties. 
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Since the main focus of the paper is on the assessment of applicability of IT in Nigeria, more 
attention is devoted to review of literature in the area
4. Studies on appraisal of conditions for 
adoption of IT in a number of countries reveal mixed outcomes. Although these studies were 
undertaken at various stages; for some countries it was before IT was implemented, and while for 
other, well after years of its implementation. A review of them, therefore, will provide some 
insights into the practical requirements, in terms of which set of particular variables matter for a 
successful implementation of the framework in Nigeria. The following is a review of some of 
them:  
 
In South Africa, for instance, Jonsson (1999) examines the implications and relative merits and 
demerits of IT and concludes that although the country has satisfied the main prerequisites of 
inflation targeting; independence of central bank, none reliance to macroeconomic objectives 
which  might  be  in  conflict  with  low  inflation,  and  relatively  developed  capital  and  money 
markets. However, what is needed is a refinement of the inflation forecasting framework and 
further experience with the operational aspects of the IT. Afterwards Woglom (2000) provides 
empirical evidences using VAR specifications that South Africa is a good candidate for inflation 
targeting. He further adds that the regime of flexible exchange rate which prevailed in South 
Africa provides automatic stabilization of IS shocks 
 
Hazirolan  (1999)  assesses  the  applicability  of  the  inflation  targeting  regime  in  the  Turkish 
economy  and gives a proposal for its implementation. However, Tutar (2002) discovers that 
disinflation should be Turkey’s major priority. Her findings suggest that inflation seems to have 
a very strong inertial nature that might be caused by high expectation, relative price adjustments 
or  institutional  arrangements  and  direct  linkage  between  monetary  policy  instruments  and 
inflation do not appear to be strong, stable and predictable. 
 
Using a VAR model, Gottschalk and Moore (2001) assessed the link between monetary policy 
instruments and inflation in Poland. Their result showed that although exchange rate was found 
to be effective with respect to output and prices, direct linkage between interest rate and inflation 
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do not appear to be very strong. Christofferson, Solk & Wescott (2001) found that Poland is 
ready for IT. Others include: Jacobson et al. (2001) investigated the empirical basis for inflation 
targeting in Sweden using a VAR framework; Thenuwara (1998) evaluates the feasibility of 
inflation  targeting  in  Sri  Lanka  by  exploring  the  causal  relationships  associated  with  the 
monetary  transmission  mechanisms;  Hoffmaiser  (1999)  uses  the  VAR  model  to  calculate 
impulse responses to exogenous monetary policy in North Korea and Soikkeli (2002) assesses 
the institutional and technical design of IT framework in Norway, etc. 
Recently, Bakradze and Billmeier (2007) examined the applicability of inflation targeting regime 
in Georgia using a baseline VAR model. Their finding was that Georgia is not yet ready to 
successfully  implement  IT  because  the  National  Bank  of  Georgia  (NBG)  suffers  from  some 
institutional  weaknesses  -  e.g.,  a  multiplicity  of  potentially  conflicting  goals  -  and  de  facto 
implementation  sometimes  falls  short  of  the  de  jure  institutional  environment.  Moreover, 
monetary  policymaking  in  Georgia  is  hampered  by  the  lack  of  a  reliable  indicator  of  the 
monetary stance - a short-term interest rate while monetary transmission mechanism highlights 
the importance of the exchange rate channel of transmission of monetary policy. 
 
Bulir, et al (2008) using three key IT communication tools - inflation targets, inflation forecasts, 
and verbal assessments of inflation factors contained in quarterly inflation reports—provided a 
consistent message in five out of six countries; Chile, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Thailand, and Sweden. However, no single central bank, according to them, in the sample stands 
out as an exceptionally good forecaster of inflation and communicator of its policies. 
 
Conceptually,  IT  describes  a  monetary  policy  framework  in  which  central  banks  accept  and 
announce certain targets of inflation, over a given period of time, as a measure of policy anchor 
and are  accountable for deviations of  actual from set targets. Three main forms of inflation 
targeting have been identified: (i) Full Fledge IT (FFIT), that is, when a country is ready to adopt 
IT as its single nominal anchor upon which macroeconomic stability would be achieved. This is 
suitable for countries with a robust or sound financial environment, and a central bank, which is 
transparent, accountable and highly committed to the attainment of the goals of IT. (ii) Eclectic 
IT (EIT) when a country, for instance, pursues IT along with other monetary policy objectives in 
a stable financial environment which, however, is less accountable and transparent. (iii) Inflation 9 
 
Targeting Lite (ITL): Low profile form of IT pursued by countries, largely due to lack of strong 
or credible macroeconomic environment. ITL countries float their exchange rate and announce 
an  inflation  target,  but  are  not  able  to  maintain  the  inflation  target  as  the  foremost  policy 
objective. Stone (2003) classified 19 emerging market countries as practitioners of ITL. Angeriz 
and  Arestis  (2007)  argue  that  FFIT  is  not  possible  in  ITL  countries  because:  (a)  Lack  of  a 
sufficiently  strong  fiscal  position  and  high  debt/GDP  ratio.  (b)  Lack  of  a  fully  developed 
monetary and financial system. (c) Vulnerability to economic shocks (especially supply shocks) 
owing  to  their  low  degree  of  development.  (d)  Lack  of  transparency  in  the  operation  and 
implementation of monetary policy. 
By extension and from the review factor militating against successful launching of FFTL are in 
other words necessary its take up. Myriad of these factors have been identified above. Here is a 
checklist of some of them. 
i)  Central bank independence 
ii)  Transparency and accountability 
iii)  Sufficiently virile financial markets in terms of both depth and breadth  
iv)  Single and well-defined inflation target  
v)  Robust econometric model for forecasting inflation   
vi)  Existence  of  stable  and  predictable  relationship  between  monetary  policy 
instruments and inflation.  
vii)  Absence of fiscal dominance  
viii)  Absence of multiple policy objectives 
ix)  Institutional considerations  
x)  Minimal burden on Central Bank financing of government deficit 
 
III.  Central Bank Independence, Transparency and Accountability  
One  feature  of  an  effective  central  bank  is  independence
5;  these  include  clear  and  precise 
mandate; authority and ability to take effective action to achieve its key objectives and effective 
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mechanism to hold the central bank to account. In terms of clear and precise mandate, the 2007 
CBN Act stated that one of the mandates of the Bank is that of achieving price stability. To 
achieve  that  the  Bank  has  instrument  autonomy  and  does  not  need  to  consult  anybody  or 
organization in the choice and use of its policy instruments for monetary management. Similarly, 
the Bank has financial autonomy and does not rely on the treasury for its operational expenses. 
In  fact  the  2007  Act  vested  the  power  to  approve  the  budget  of  the  Bank  in  the  Board  of 
Directors. To ensure the independence of the Bank the Governor can only be removed by the 
President provided that  the removal shall be supported by two-thirds  majority of the Senate 
praying that he be so removed. 
  
The day-to-day activities of the CBN are quite transparent and truly accountable as enshrined the 
CBN Act. Information about the bank’s activities is available on a daily basis on the bank’s 
website. Besides, a wide range of monetary and financial data is published at regular intervals. 
Specifically, Section 35 of the 2007 CBN Act states: “The Bank shall make public, at all times, 
its monetary policy rate”. The Bank has, in addition, powers to hold external reserves, conduct 
treasury operations, regulate credits in the economy and manage liquidity, all in pursuance of the 
core mandate of the Bank. A committee which is strategic in this regard is the monetary policy 
committee (MPC). It communicates its decisions to the public immediately after its meeting 
which whole bi-monthly. Section 12 Sub-sections (1) states the composition of the committee as 
follows: 
 
“In order to facilitate the attainment of price stability and to support the economic policy of the 
Federal Government, there shall be a Committee of the Bank known as the Monetary Policy 
Committee (in this Act referred to as “the MPC”) which shall consist of: a) the Governor of the 
Bank who shall be the Chairman b) the four Deputy Governors of the Bank c) two members of 
the Board of Directors of the Bank d) three members appointed by the President e) two members 
appointed by the Governor”  
 
The conduct of Monetary Policy in Nigeria and all activities of the Central Bank of Nigeria relate 
with the core mandate of the bank as an apex institution. Therefore, in pursuance of its functions 
and in compliance its core mandate, the CBN undertakes monetary policy in order to:  
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￿  Maintain Nigeria’s external reserves to safeguard the international value of the legal currency. 
￿   Promote and maintenance of monetary stability and a sound and efficient financial system in 
Nigeria.  
￿  Act as banker and financial adviser to the Federal Government; and 
￿   Act as lender of last resort to banks.  
 
Important  to  the  attainment  of  a  sound  monetary  policy  is  the  identification  of  a  reliable 
monetary  transmission  mechanism
6,  which  best  evokes  monetary  actions  into  desired  target. 
Over the conduct of monetary policy in Nigeria has undergone significant changes. From the use 
of direct instruments of monetary controls during the pre-adjustment period up to 1986 to a shift 
towards  an  indirect  approach  anchored  on  the  use  of  market  based  instruments  in  monetary 
management. The desire is to wipe away distortions and inefficiencies that had bedeviled the 
financial system caused by long years of use of administrative instruments of control. The aim is 
also  to  engender  competition  among  the  operators  in  the  financial  system  and  the  entire 
economy. 
Table 1 presents some monetary policy aggregates in the Nigerian economy between 1999 and 
2007. For those variables that go in the same direction, high growth rate of M2 prompts high 
monetization of the economy and this causes high inflation. Impressively, however, inflation 
turned out to be in a single digit in 2006 and 2007 and this is a good outcome for IT. Exchange 
rate on the other hand depreciates, though not persistently.    
Table 1:   Monetary Policy Outcomes, 1999 – 2007 
Aggregate  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
M2 Money Growth  32.5  21.3  17.7  19.4  25.0  12.3  16.6  30.6  30.9 
CPI Inflation  6.6  6.9  18.9  12.9  23.8  10.0  11.6  8.5  6.6 
Fiscal Balance  29.7  15.5  21.7  18.8  15.4  11.5  8.4  4.9  4.8 
Exchange Rate  29.7  102.1  111.9  121.0  129.4  133.5  132.1  128.7  125.8 
                   
Memorandum Items                   
Real GDP growth  3.0  3.8  4.7  4.6  9.6  6.6  6.5  6.0  6.2 
Monetization (M2/GDP)  21.9  22.8  28.1  29.6  28.6  19.8  18.0  19.8  25.5 
Credit to the Economy/GDP  19.8  10.4  18.1  16.7  17.8  17.3  15.5  4.14  11.3 
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an ongoing study by Research Department of Central Bank of Nigeria on Monetary Transmission Mechanism. 
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Source: Obtained from Statistical Bulletin and  Annual Reports and Statement of  Accounts of Central Bank of 
Nigeria, various issues. 
 
Fiscal profile of the government declines almost throughout with no serious threat of dominance. 
Rate of real GDP growth revealed an impressive performance in 2003 and remained stable at 
around 6 percent afterwards. The ratio of credit to the economy to GDP is moderate. Notice that 
the above tends revealed only a casual relationship in and between the aggregates. Any definite 
cause and effect interaction could be best obtained by recourse to more serious econometric 
analysis. We present the research methodology of the study in the next section.  
IV.  Methodology of the Paper 
In  this  section,  we  examine  one  major  empirical  precondition
7  of  inflation  targeting  regime 
mentioned above; trying to build a solid understanding of the relationship between monetary 
policy instruments and inflation rate measured in terms of consumer price index. To achieve the 
above  and  in  line  with  the  methodology  employed  by  Gottschalk  and  Moore  (2001),  Tutar 
(2002)  and,  more  recently,  by  Bakradze  and  Billmeier  (2007),  this  paper  adopts  vector 
autoregression  (VAR)  methodology  and  the  Granger  causality  tests  in  both  bivariate  and 
multivariate  forms.  The  VAR  methodology  is  commonly  used  for  forecasting  systems  of 
interrelated time series and for analyzing the dynamic impact of random disturbances on the 
system of variables.  
The general mathematical representation of a VAR is:  
       Xt = A(L)Xt – 1 +  B(L)Zt + εt            (1) 
Equation (1) is saying that Xt is a k vector of endogenous variable, Zt is a d vector of exogenous 
variables, A and B are matrices of reduced-form coefficients to be estimated, and εt is a vector of 
innovations, impulses or shocks. We estimate the reduced-form VAR and identified monetary 
policy shocks through the liquidity, interest rate and exchange rate channels. The endogenous 
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banks  without an established track record for providing  durable  monetary  stability could gain credibility  fairly 
quickly by designing frameworks that provide appropriate incentives for government and the central bank to deliver 
low inflation. These in turn can help to build a constituency for low inflation that involved a virtuous circle of 
reducing inflation expectations and strengthening society’s confidence in its monetary institutions. 
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variables in the model consists of the gross domestic product (yt), consumer price index (cpi), 
domestic money supply (dms), fiscal spending (fs), interest rate (ir) and exchange rate (er) 
    Xt  =  (yt, cpi, dms, fs, ir, er)’         (2) 
The ordering of the variables follows the lower diagonal value of a correlation matrix and the 
degree of endogeneity to current economic conditions and in line with the Cholesky ordering 
criteria.  We  use  data  at  quarterly  frequency  from  1986Q1  t0  2007Q4  obtained  from  the 
publications  of  Central  Bank  of  Nigeria  and  international  financial  statistics  (IFS)  from  the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The VAR has 5 lags - in line with the information provided 
by the lag section criteria, no constant or time trend and uses logarithm for all variables except 
interest rate where we have used the level. We run the VAR in levels in line with the Bayesian 
methodology, which according to Mountford (2005) the methodology is robust to the presence of 
non-stationarity and though it does not impose any cointegrating long run relationships between 
the variables, it does not preclude their existence either.  
V.  Empirical Analysis 
One  of  the  main  prerequisite  for  a  successful  adoption  of  inflation  targeting  framework  as 
expounded in many empirical studies is the existence of a stable and predictable relationship 
between  monetary  policy  instruments  and  inflation.  In  this  section  we  present  the  empirical 
results of our VAR model, which contains six endogenous variables as specified in equation (2). 
Meanwhile, as a preliminary analysis, the Granger causality tests on some select channels of 
monetary transmission are presented as follows. 
Table 2 presents the results of the bivariate and multivariate block Granger causality tests for 
price (cpi) and output (yt) in Nigeria. The test  tests whether an endogenous variable can be 
treated  as  exogenous  for  each  equation  in  the  VAR.  Overall,  the  results  suggest  the  joint 
significance of the policy variables on cpi and yt. The joint probabilities for the multivariate tests 
suggest  the  rejection  of  the  null  hypothesis.  The  bivariate  tests  for  cpi  suggest  that  all  the 
variables  except  interest  rate  cause  significant  variations  in  cpi.  This  is  consistent  with  the 
expectations; that is, the level of output, money supply, exchange rate and fiscal spending cause 
variations in the level of prices or the cpi. 
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The results further show that two key monetary policy variables; interest rate and money supply, 
significantly  drive  output.  Government’s  fiscal  spending  too,  significantly  drives  output. 
However, exchange rate and prices are insignificant. The findings support one of the main policy 
thrust of monetary policy in Nigeria of achieving of price stability and economic growth via 
monetary policy. 
 
  Table 2: Granger Causality Tests: Baseline VAR, 1999–2006 1/  
Effect on price (cpi)  Chi-square  Probability 
yt  7.23  0.124* 
Dms  8.69  0.069* 
Er  8.38  0.079* 
Fs  7.60  0.108* 
Ir  4.50  0.342 
Joint  34.56  0.023* 
Effect on Output (yt)     
Dms  5.6  0.231** 
Cpi  2.97  0.562 
Er  4.72  0.317 
Fs  7.66  0.105* 
Ir  24.92  0.000* 
Joint  49.93  0.000* 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
1/ The block Granger causality test for exclusion of a variable is based on a Wald test and follows 
a χ² distribution; * and ** denote rejection of the exclusion at the 1 and 5 percent level. 
 
An intuitive way to interpret the relationship between monetary policy instruments and cpi using 
VAR is to compute an impulse response function (IFR). An impulse response function traces the 
effect  of  a  one-time  shock  to  one  of  the  innovations  on  current  and  future  values  of  the 
endogenous  variables.  In  our  analysis,  for  instance,  if  there  is  a  strong  and  predictable 
relationship between the monetary policy instruments and future cpi, then it can be said that the 
lagged changes in the monetary policy instruments are economically important in explaining 
future cpi. Throughout, we use a period of 12 quarters ahead in the analysis of impulse response 
function and the variance decompositions and 95 percent confidence interval, is represented by 
the dotted lines.  
 15 
 
In figure 1 below, the quarterly impulse response functions indicate how the monetary policy and 
other related variables affect cpi. In other words, it shows how cpi responds to innovations or 
shocks in the other endogenous variables as specified in the VAR equation 2. The response of 
cpi to its own shocks is contemporaneously very strong and also in the quarter following the 
shock and throughout the short and medium term horizons at an average of 4-5 percent, but, less 
persistent afterwards. Also, a one-standard deviation shock to domestic money supply results in 
an increase in cpi of about 2.1 percent in the quarter following the shock and remains significant 
in the fourth quarter. This is despite the initial undershooting in the first and third quarter. The 
response  stabilizes  at  an  average  of  a  little  above  2  percent  in  the  medium  and  long  term 
horizons. The response of money supply
8 on the other hand, to innovations in cpi is, however, 
negative at close to 2 percent in the medium term and an average of 2.6 percent in the long term 
horizon. By way of summing up, while expansionary monetary policy, which works through the 
liquidity  channel,  positively  affects  prices  in  the  economy,  inflationary  pressure  is  usually 
followed by contractionary monetary measures in the economy. 
 
The response of cpi to positive innovations in output is, however, counterintuitive, though very 
strong at average of 3.5 percent in the short and medium term horizons and subsequently up to 
5.9 percent somewhere in the long term. This implies that increase in productivity rather than 
leads to a decline in prices generate more inflationary pressure in the economy. More consistent 
is the response of output to shocks in cpi, which in line with theoretical postulations, shows an 
inverse link – see appendix for more results.  
 
                                                           




Furthermore, consistent with theory is the response of cpi to innovations in exchange rate, which 
is very strong, especially in the medium term, it stood at an average of 4 percent. This implies 
that  persistent  exchange  rate  depreciation  causes  inflation
9.  This  finding  could  be  expected 
because  of  the  reliance  of  the  economy  on  imported  food  and  other  items.  This  strongly 
corroborates the above findings in table 2 and hence a pointer to the strength of the exchange rate 
channel  as a means of  checking inflation. While a number of studies
10 show that a  flexible 
                                                           
9 The exchange rate-cpi link suggests the effect of exchange rate pass-through, that is, the degree by which exchange 
rate depreciation translate into inflation in the economy. 
10 See Bernanke et al. (1999), Mishkin and Savastano (2002) and De Gregorio, Tokman and Valdes (2005). Edward 
(2006) analyze three key issues in his study: i) the effectiveness of nominal exchange rates as shock absorbers in 
countries with inflation targeting, which is closely related to the magnitude of the "pass-through" coefficient. ii) 17 
 
exchange rate regime is consistent with the inflation targeting framework, others, however, show 
that this could generate more instability when the exchange rate is allowed to float
11.  
 
The response of cpi to fiscal spending is consistent, less severe – at less than 1 percent on the 
average, and is less persistent over the time horizons. This is contrary to the results in table 2. 
Finally,  the  response  of  cpi  to  interest  rate  –  3  months  deposit  rate,  is  generally  weak, 
counterintuitive  and  less  persistent.  So  is  also  the  response  of  interest  to  price  shocks.  This 
supports the result of Granger causality test reported in table 2 and as well suggests that interest 
rate channel of monetary transmission is weak. 
 
Variance decomposition results presented in table 3 corroborate the above empirical findings 
from  the  impulse  responses.  The  12  period  forecast  (3  years)  show  that,  put  together,  the 
variances of output, money supply, exchange rate fiscal spending and interest rate account for 
less  that  50  percent  of  variability  in  cpi.  In  other  words,  innovations  to  these  endogenous 
variables explain less 50 percent variation in the level of consumer price index in the short and 
medium term horizons. This implies that the price behavior is characterized by inertial nature or 
is apathetical within these time horizons. Therefore, a policy change in either money supply or 
interest rate is unlikely to bring desired change in price as the two accounted for less than 15 
percent (jointly) in the short and medium term. In the long term, however, the trend gradually 
changes, cpi accounts for less than 45 percent of its variance while output and exchange rate 
gained more prominence. This further underscores the need for an increase in productivity and 
importance of the exchange rate channel in checking inflation in the economy.  
The variance decomposition of output follows suit as it also chiefly drives its own variance in the 
first quarter. The variance of interest rate forcefully took over in the medium term, accounting 
for over ½ of output variability and over ⅓ in the long term horizon. This truly reflect our 
discovery in table 2 where the latter strongly Granger cause the former.    
                                                                                                                                                                                           
whether exchange rate volatility is different in countries with an inflation targeting regime than in countries with 
alternative monetary policy arrangements. iii) whether the exchange rate should play a role in determining the 
monetary policy stance under inflation targeting.  
11 This connection between inflation targeting and floating exchange rates has led some analysts to argue that one of 
the costs of IT is the increase in exchange rate volatility. However, recent study by Edward (2007) argues that there 
is no need for the authorities to abstain completely from intervention in the foreign exchange market. 18 
 
Table 3: Variance Decomposition: VAR, 1986Q1–2006Q4 
(In percent of total variance) 
Variance Decomposition of CPI:             
Period  S.E.  YT  DMS  CPI  ER  FS  IR 
1  0.040689  2.271086  3.373526  94.35539  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
2  0.064954  5.849749  4.436332  86.67507  2.103144  0.917074  0.018636 
3  0.085957  11.78645  4.043581  77.49763  4.39067  1.133573  1.148097 
4  0.111246  12.64488  6.350427  68.40082  10.55253  1.095392  0.955951 
5  0.130773  13.3771  8.448556  62.56622  13.47103  0.961304  1.175791 
6  0.147241  14.59483  8.822429  58.12611  16.12265  0.858693  1.475293 
7  0.162316  14.54152  8.566143  57.21748  16.64349  1.567233  1.46413 
8  0.175295  16.0195  9.607804  52.88541  17.55521  1.45628  2.475797 
9  0.187228  18.12044  10.95031  48.99512  18.18612  1.414214  2.33379 
10  0.197142  19.82575  10.80463  47.14089  18.07911  1.865403  2.284218 
11  0.206331  22.87934  10.50636  43.77798  18.40055  1.870787  2.564985 
12  0.215415  24.39233  10.93614  42.27761  17.78639  1.971502  2.636035 
 Variance Decomposition of YT:             
Period  S.E.  YT  DMS  CPI  ER  FS  IR 
1  0.048745  100  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
2  0.060003  85.48264  0.28409  1.10365  0.007869  0.08432  13.03743 
3  0.069554  69.08072  0.307109  0.762887  0.004502  0.05994  29.78485 
4  0.079308  53.50970  1.589696  0.462939  0.491839  0.121089  43.82474 
5  0.09543  41.74796  2.272447  0.591329  0.930217  0.203024  54.25502 
6  0.105018  35.05878  3.474235  1.366036  2.96312  0.641015  56.49681 
7  0.115789  31.03246  5.267123  1.900086  6.81929  1.365692  53.61535 
8  0.12747  28.88327  6.951155  2.3792  10.58112  2.12932  49.07594 
9  0.139757  28.15783  8.350472  2.796563  13.42415  3.326445  43.94454 
10  0.151549  28.49554  9.53839  3.186676  14.5649  4.513205  39.70129 
11  0.163469  29.67405  10.45181  3.561651  14.37312  5.614539  36.32482 
12  0.174479  31.36517  10.95398  3.848665  13.47403  6.65031  33.70784 
 Cholesky  Ordering:  YT  DMS  CPI  ER 
FS IR             
 
Other variance decompositions
12 of the variables in the VAR model show that money supply 
drives its own variance in the short term, but, subsequently by variances of output and fiscal 
                                                           








spending. Exchange rate also shapes its own variance in the short term and then by the variance 
of government’s fiscal spending. Earlier, the decomposition of the variance of output shows that 
the nexus between fiscal spending and output is very weak - the variance of the latter accounts 
for less than one-tenth of variations in the former throughout the three time horizons; short, 
medium and long term, this in a feedback effect is confirmed from the decomposition of the 
variance of fiscal spending. However, contrary expectations and to what in reality obtains, the 
variance of interest rate accounts for over 60 percent (almost two-third of variation in fiscal 
spending) in the medium term and more than 50 percent (over one-half of variation in fiscal 
spending) in the long term.  Lastly, in line with our earlier findings, the variance of output drives 
about one-third of variability in the level of interest rate 
 
The nexus between monetary policy instruments and cpi is further explored using additional 
endogenous variables by the authors. These include; treasury bills rate, lending rate and ratio of 
credit to money supply. A four-variable VAR is estimated using lag 1 and 2 as suggested by the 




lag selection criteria and the ordering of the variables also follows the Cholesky criteria. Figure 2 
presents the impulse responses of only cpi to innovations in other endogenous variables in the 
model. Again, the response of cpi to its own shocks, except for the initial overshooting is very 
strong in the quarter following the shock and throughout the short and medium term horizons. 
The response of cpi to innovations in the other three variables is, however, insignificant even 
though is theoretically consistent. The ratio of credit to lagged M2, for instance, deflates cpi in 
the quarter following the shock by only a-half of a percent. This remains very low in the medium 
term and a little above 1 percent in the long term horizon. The response of cpi to innovations in 
the Treasury Bills rate (tbr) is consistent only within the short term horizon although it is highly 
marginal also. Counter intuitively, the effect in the medium and long term horizons became 
positive and remained very low throughout. Lending rate’s innovations exert negative effect on 
cpi as expected but also very insignificant. It was 1 percent in the quarter following the shock 
and less than half of a percent throughout. 
Table 4: Variance Decomposition: VAR, 1986Q1–2006Q4 
(In percent of total variance) 
Variance Decompositions of CPI       
Period  S.E.  CPI  CMS  TBR  LR 
1  0.184575  100  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
2  0.205207  99.18363  0.075026  0.427554  0.313793 
3  0.239953  99.17586  0.240278  0.335178  0.248682 
4  0.25971  99.22057  0.232488  0.299612  0.247331 
5  0.279675  99.19027  0.333436  0.258792  0.217504 
6  0.295027  99.20980  0.358532  0.232560  0.199105 
7  0.309013  99.15558  0.450295  0.212184  0.181943 
8  0.320776  99.12210  0.511277  0.197353  0.169269 
9  0.331298  99.05235  0.603438  0.185408  0.158801 
10  0.340474  98.99097  0.682645  0.175850  0.150531 
11  0.348694  98.91462  0.773971  0.167742  0.143669 
12  0.356001  98.84226  0.858722  0.160928  0.138089 
 Cholesky Ordering: CPI CMS TBR LR       
 
Variance decompositions presented in table 4 attest the above findings. The results show that cpi 
uniquely drives its own variance in the short, medium and long term horizons. This unveils the 
fact that the level of prices or cpi in the model is an inertial phenomena; meaning predictions 
about cpi could best be obtained within the cpi itself. Over 99 percent of the variance of cpi is 21 
 
explained by the itself in throughout the horizons. This implies that past information on the level 
of cpi is very critical in the determination of future level of cpi. 
 
VI.  Conclusions and Recommendations   
This paper seeks to explore the applicability of IT in the Nigerian economy based on historical 
data from 1986 to 2006. Although the three key conditions for IT have been identified in the 
literature; this paper examines only one, which is the existence of a predictable relationship 
between  monetary  policy  instruments  and  inflation  (the  others  being  CBN  autonomy  and 
transparency  and  accountability).  The  authors  employed  Granger  causality  tests  and  an 
unrestricted VAR methodology with five variables in a 4 lag specification. 
The  bivariate  and  multivariate  Granger  causality  tests  show  that  the  level  of  output,  money 
supply, exchange rate and fiscal spending in the economy cause variations in the level of prices 
or the cpi while interest rate does not. Output variations were found to be significantly caused by 
interest rate, money supply and the level of fiscal spending, while the roles of exchange rate and 
prices were quite insignificant.  
 
The impulse response functions from the VAR model show that the response of cpi to its own 
shocks is contemporaneously very strong and remain so throughout the short and medium term 
horizons, but, less persistent afterwards. The response of cpi to innovations in money supply 
(liquidity channel) and interest rate (interest rate channel) were found to be less significant. This 
was reinforced by results from variance decomposition of the cpi where the latter two accounted 
for less than 15 percent of the variance of the former in both the short and medium term. Similar 
results were obtained when additional variables – monetary indicators, such as ratio of credit to 
money supply, treasury bills rate and 3-months lending rate, were used. Interest rate, however, 
was found to be a strong driver of productivity in the economy. Although these findings do not 
suggest total ineffectiveness of the monetary channels, it however raise doubt when the monetary 
authority solely rely on them as instruments for achieving effective inflation targeting regime.  
 
On the other hand, the nexus between cpi and exchange rate and cpi and productivity were found 
to be robust in the long term although the latter is counterintuitive. Real sector productivity is 22 
 
paramount in any fight against inflation. Also, the significance of the exchange rate channel 
given by the inverse link between cpi and exchange rate suggest the effect of exchange rate-pass 
through on the level of prices in the economy. Productivity along with exchange rate accounted 
for significant percentage of the variance of cpi in both the medium and long term.  The results 
further show no threat of fiscal dominance in the sample. 
 
In view of the above findings, which in conclusion reveal no strong quantitative link between 
monetary  aggregates  and  prices,  the  paper  recommends  that  Nigeria  should  not    pursue  full 
fledged inflation targeting rather Nigeria should adopt inflation targeting lite given the enormous 
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